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Every emerging infectious disease is a challenge to
the whole of mankind. There is no name, no clear-
cut clinical diagnosis, no test, no idea of clinical
course, no idea of long-term implications, little
idea how it is spread, little knowledge of the start
and end of infectiousness, and questions regarding
short- and long-term immunity. There are uncer-
tainties regarding whether there will be a pandem-
ic, will it be caused by H5N1, when or where it
will occur, how imminent it is, or how severe it
will be. The uncertainty and destructive potential
of disease outbreaks and adult public health emer-
gencies give them a high public and political pro-
file.1 In the last few decades, new diseases began
to emerge at an unprecedented rate of one or more
per year. Furthermore, new highly contagious dis-
eases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and avian influenza, know no borders.
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Every emerging infectious disease is a challenge to the whole of mankind. There are uncertainties regard-
ing whether there will be a pandemic, if it will be caused by the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus,
when or where it will occur, how imminent or how severe it will be. No one can accurately predict if and
when a given virus will become a pandemic virus. Pandemic prevention strategies must be based on pre-
paring for the unexpected and being capable of reacting accordingly. There is growing evidence that infec-
tion control measures were helpful in containment of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as well as
avian influenza. Compliance of standard infection control measures, intensive promotion of hand and res-
piratory hygiene, vigilance and triage of patients with febrile illness, and specific infection control measures
are key components to contain a highly contagious disease in hospital and to protect healthcare workers,
patients and visitors. The importance of standard precautions for any patient and cleaning and disinfec-
tion for the healthcare environment cannot be overemphasized. SARS illustrated dramatically the poten-
tial of air travel and globalization for the dissemination of an emerging infectious disease. To prevent the
potential serious consequences of pandemic influenza, timely implementation of pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical interventions locally within the outbreak area is the key to minimizing global spread.
Herein, we relate our perspective on useful lessons derived from a review of the SARS epidemic that may
be useful to physicians, especially when looking ahead to the next epidemic. [J Formos Med Assoc 2008;
107(6):432–442]
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SARS originated in November 2002 in the
Guangdong Province of China, and by February
2003, had spread to Hong Kong and subsequent-
ly to 32 other countries or regions, infecting 8096
patients and resulting in 774 deaths.2,3 SARS is
unique in several aspects. SARS was the first
emerging infectious disease for which WHO issued
a global alert, on March 12, 2003. It illustrated
dramatically the potential of air travel and global-
ization for the dissemination of an emerging in-
fectious disease. The concentration of cases in
previously healthy adults and the proportion of
patients requiring intensive care was particularly
alarming.4–7 SARS caused morbidity and mortality
in healthcare workers (HCWs) and intrahospital
transmission amplified regional outbreaks and
augmented spread of the illness into the commu-
nity.2,3 All added a tremendous burden to health-
care systems in the absence of natural disaster or
war. The cost of SARS was substantial: a 4% drop
in GDP in Hong Kong (> 6 billion US dollars) was
estimated by the Asian Development Bank.8
From SARS, we know that an infectious disease
in one country is a threat to all. An infectious dis-
ease outbreak reveals weaknesses in the public
health infrastructure. Emerging infectious diseases
can be contained with a high level of government
commitment and international collaboration.1,9,10
Multidisciplinary approaches and cooperation
from veterinary, medical, public health, epidemi-
ology, microbiology and immunology commu-
nities are important for the protection of everyone.
In our ever-shrinking world, widespread media
coverage of infections—ranging from SARS and
influenza in Asia to acute gastroenteritis due to
norovirus on cruise ships in Europe and the out-
break due to Escherichia coli 0157 in the United
States—has raised public interest in contagious
diseases to new heights.11 Recent experiences with
the highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1
have given the world its first advance warning
that another influenza pandemic may be immi-
nent.1,12,13 To prevent the potential serious con-
sequences of a pandemic, timely implementation
of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical in-
terventions locally within the outbreak area is the
key to minimizing global spread.12,14 As air travel
and global trade are now commonplace and have
facilitated the international spread of emerging
infectious diseases within a very short period of
time, a review of the lessons learned from the latest
outbreak of SARS is important.
Transmissibility and Containment
Strategies
SARS is a zoonotic disease caused by a new corona-
virus (SARS-CoV).2,9,15,16 SARS-CoV evolved con-
sistently and rapidly within its animal and human
hosts, while both the infectivity of the virus and
the severity of the disease varied, along with the
variation/adaptation of the virus to its hosts.16
Transmissibility refers to the capacity of an infec-
tious agent to spread from one person to another,
and risk of infection depends on the conditions
of exposure.17 Lipsitch et al18 and Riley et al19
calculated that the basic case reproduction num-
ber (R0)—the fundamental epidemiologic quan-
tity that determines the potential for disease
spread—is of the order of 2–4 (excluding super-
spreading events). Both studies suggested that an
achievable combination of control measures, in-
cluding hand washing, the use of an appropriate
and well-fitted facemask, isolation of SARS cases,
enhanced surveillance and effective contact tracing
and quarantine of asymptomatic contacts (short-
ening the time from symptom onset to isolation
of patients), can be effective in containing SARS,
as mentioned previously.7,20 Transmission rates
fell during the epidemic: R0 fell from a mean of 
7 in the first week of the Singapore outbreak to 
a mean of 1.6 in the second week, to a mean below
1 in most weeks thereafter.18
Molecular epidemiologic studies indicated
that viruses from the outbreaks in Hong Kong,
Vietnam, Singapore, Toronto, and Taiwan are clon-
ally related.21–24 Compliance with standard pre-
cautions, alertness and using inline suction for
the undiagnosed SARS patient (first SARS patient
in Taiwan) who had respiratory failure and was
intubated in the emergency room (ER) were 
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the reasons that no HCWs became seropositive
and no intrahospital spread occurred before 
implementation of specific infection control strat-
egies at the National Taiwan University Hospital
(NTUH).25 Unexpectedly, the good performance
of NTUH during the initial phase of the SARS
epidemic in Taiwan resulted in underestimation
of the continuous risk of transmission from the
neighboring affected areas into Taiwan.26–28
A similar situation developed in Canada and 
resulted in a second wave of the epidemic.29
Super-spreading Events
Experts were concerned about the evident het-
erogeneity in transmission.30 In extreme instances
of SARS, there were super-spreading events,
where single individuals apparently infected as
many as 300 others.29,31,32 Understanding and
quantifying these super-spreading events is clearly
vital for the containment of SARS.30 However, 
it remains difficult to differentiate such super-
spreading events that are due to persons secret-
ing an exceptionally high amount of infectious
material, from those with an environmental fac-
tor working to amplify transmission at some key
phase of virus shedding. For example, aerosol-
generating procedures and environmental con-
tamination may have contributed to a large
intrahospital spread in the epidemic of SARS.6,33
A recent study revealed that the independent risk
factors associated with nosocomial outbreaks of
SARS among hospital wards in Guangzhou and
Hong Kong, China, included a distance between
beds of ≤ 1 m, lack of availability of washing or
changing facilities for staff (protective), resuscita-
tion performed in the ward, staff members work-
ing while experiencing symptoms, host patient
(index patient or the first patient with SARS ad-
mitted to a ward) requiring oxygen therapy, and
host patient requiring bi-level positive airway
pressure ventilation.34
Two aforementioned phenomena warrant cau-
tion when we are facing emerging pandemic in-
fluenza: travel and super-spreading events.35,36
It is anticipated that adults undertaking inter-
national travel might be infected and spread the
disease worldwide, as noted during the SARS 
epidemic.4 Once the elderly and persons with
chronic illnesses are infected, the clinical presen-
tation might be atypical and masked by comor-
bidities. Furthermore, viral load might be high and
viral shedding might be prolonged in immuno-
compromised hosts, resulting in a high chance of
spread.37 Thus, super-spreading events should be
taken into consideration during preparedness for
a pandemic. The community, patients and visitors
should be educated in addition to HCWs.
Mode of Transmission and Infection
Control Strategies
The major mode of transmission of SARS-CoV is
through close contact, in particular, through ex-
posure to droplets of respiratory secretions from
an infected person.2 Thus, wearing masks is em-
phasized. However, two overlapping sets of disease
signs and symptoms have been reported, with
some patients having varying degrees of enteric
disease. Diarrhea developed early in the course
of disease.38,39 Up to seven of the first 10 patients
at NTUH38 and five of the first 10 patients in
Canada40 had diarrhea. Although a review of data
from China, Hong Kong, Canada and Singapore
showed that only 20.1% of patients had diarrhea,2
up to 73.3% of 75 patients treated with ribavirin
and steroids had watery diarrhea.41 Some of these
differences may result from the timing and quality
of data collection. In our cohort, diarrhea devel-
oped before the occurrence of cough42–44 and be-
came exacerbated in parallel to desaturation in
the second week of illness.38,41
SARS-CoV in feces was identified by RT-PCR
in 97% at day 14 and positivity rates were highest
in feces, followed by nasopharyngeal aspirates and
urine samples.41 The virus is stable in feces and
urine and can survive after drying on surfaces.45,46
Thus, contamination of the environment by in-
fectious respiratory secretions or other body fluids
(e.g. saliva, tears, urine, feces) may play a role in
Y.C. Chen, et al
434 J Formos Med Assoc | 2008 • Vol 107 • No 6
disease transmission.28,33 Thus, educating HCWs,
patients, caregivers and visitors to maintain both
hand hygiene and environmental hygiene together
are important. SARS-CoV is completely inactivated
by ≤ 5 minutes of exposure to 75% ethanol,
500 ppm hypochlorite, and household deter-
gent.45,46 Disinfection and disinfestations are im-
portant in healthcare settings and households.
Disinfection of the sewage system, elimination
of rodents and cockroaches, and proper garbage
disposal are also important.
Influenza is transmitted through close contact
via large droplets, direct or indirect. Fine droplet
inhalational transmission may also occur.12,13,35,36
Adults infected by seasonal influenza virus are
typically infectious at or before the onset of ill-
ness. Young children and immunocompromised
persons can shed the virus for longer than healthy
adults. Contagiousness of influenza varies in-
versely with the level of immunity in the popula-
tion.17,37 Thus, the containment or attenuation of
pandemic influenza before the availability of an
effective vaccination depends on early detection
and before large numbers are involved.12
Recently, a case report described a human
H5N1 infection with fever and diarrhea but no
respiratory symptoms.47 Avian influenza virus
can survive in the environment for days, but it
can be inactivated by standard hospital disinfec-
tants.36 Once again, the importance of routine
cleaning and disinfection following standard pro-
cedures for the healthcare environment cannot
be overemphasized.
Implicit Cases and Patients with 
Dual Diagnosis
Unrecognized cases of SARS are probably the most
important factor that led to intrahospital spread
and cases among HCWs.6,27,28,48 The nonspecific
signs and symptoms, long incubation period
(mean, 6.4 days), long time between onset of
symptoms and hospital admission (from 3–5
days),32 and lack of a reliable diagnostic test in
the early phase of the illness can lead to potential
transmission to frontline HCWs and the com-
munity. Early diagnosis relies on known history
of potential exposure to SARS. High vigilance is
needed and clinicians must be familiar with the
rapidly changing epidemiology of this infection.
Despite efforts in developing rapid laboratory
assays for SARS, the sensitivity of RT-PCR for sam-
ples collected during the first 3 days of illness is
inadequate for infection control purposes. Yet it
is not practical and cost-effective to screen every
patient with febrile illness when the incidence of
disease is relatively low or when the epidemic be-
comes overwhelming. Screening tools using easily
available symptomatic and laboratory items are
highly desirable. A 6-item clinical score was devel-
oped for triaging patients with febrile illness in
the emergency room.42–44 The sensitivity reached
92.6% and the specificity 71.2%.42 In this model,
we emphasize the sequential development of
symptoms and diarrhea in addition to cough.44
As this scoring system was implemented irre-
spective of the epidemiological link, it was useful
when SARS was spreading in the community.
However, limitations remained. As this discrimi-
nation system was generated during non-influenza
seasons and the majority of patients in the depri-
vation cohort were otherwise healthy adults, the
predictive value decreased in the validation cohort
when patients with comorbidity acquired SARS.43
The predictive value is anticipated to decrease in
those without immunity to seasonal influenza
during the influenza season.
Early in the SARS epidemic, a case definition
was generated for epidemiological purposes.49
Despite a global alert, several cases remained un-
recognized and outbreak investigation found these
implicit cases with either atypical presentation or
in the early stage of infection, comorbidity or old
age. All evidence suggests that heightened vigi-
lance and infection-control measures should be
maintained routinely.
The index case causing intrahospital spread in
Southern Taiwan was admitted under the diag-
nosis of acute pyelonephritis.48 A pulmonary con-
solidation was noted incidentally during a routine
chest X-ray. The history of the visit to Hospital A in
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Taipei (the first intrahospital spread of SARS in
Taiwan) was not obtained until an infectious dis-
ease specialist was consulted for persistent fever.
The index case causing the NTUH ER outbreak
was a 73-year-old man with chronic cardiopul-
monary and renal diseases. He had dyspnea and
orthopnea. He denied the history of visits to Hos-
pital A for fear of being stigmatized.28 The first
patient linked to the second phase of the Ontario
outbreak was a 96-year-old man admitted with 
a fractured pelvis.29 He had no apparent contact
with a patient or an HCW with SARS, and aspira-
tion pneumonia and Clostridium difficile-associated
diarrhea appeared to be probable explanations
for his symptoms. Both elderly patients develop-
ed fever and new pulmonary infiltration during
hospitalization.
Fisher et al were the first to report four patients
with atypical presentations of SARS.50 All had
chronic cardiopulmonary diseases and three were
elderly patients. According to the updated interim
US CDC case definition for SARS on July 16, 2003,
the clinical criteria of SARS include asymptomatic
or mild respiratory illness, moderate respiratory
illness, and severe respiratory illness.51 This guide-
line emphasized that clinical judgment should be
used when evaluating patients for whom a meas-
ured temperature of > 38°C has not been docu-
mented. Factors that might be considered include
patient self-report of fever, use of antipyretics,
presence of immunocompromising conditions or
therapies, lack of access to healthcare, or inability
to obtain a measured temperature.
Asymptomatic or mild cases, though limited in
numbers, were documented.52–57 The seropreva-
lence of antibody to SARS-CoV in cohorts of HCWs
with subclinical infection in SARS and non-SARS
medical wards was 2.3% and 0%, respectively.57
A seroprevalence survey in Guangzhou identified
its presence in 40% of animal traders, 20% of an-
imal slaughterers, 5% of vegetable traders and 0%
of controls.15 Che et al52 recently reported the first
case of asymptomatic SARS with antigenemia and
seroconversion who worked in the same restaurant
with one of the four community-acquired cases
of SARS.
What We Know for Certain
Although it is impossible to predict the individ-
ual emergence in time and place, we can be con-
fident that new microbial diseases will emerge.
Every one of us should work together to build 
a stronger, more flexible healthcare and public
health system that is well-prepared to respond to
known disease problems, as well as to address the
unexpected, whether it be an influenza pandemic,
a disease caused by an unknown organism, or 
a bioterrorist attack.
SARS and highly pathogenic avian influenza
are two important emergent infections with pan-
demic potential. Both infections have crossed the
species barrier to infect humans. As with the out-
break of SARS, the development of sensitive and
accurate early diagnostic tests is extremely im-
portant for successful control of the outbreak at
source. The availability of isolation facilities, the
stockpiling of antiviral agents and effective and
safe vaccination will be extremely important in
minimizing the damage of a new influenza pan-
demic. However, there are important differences
in the dynamics of infection between SARS and in-
fluenza A/H5N1 which have had an impact on
infection control (Table).58–64
Reinforcement of infection control measures
and compliance monitoring on a regular basis
Standard precautions should be applied to every
patient and education should be given to every-
one in healthcare facilities.25 HCWs, caregivers and
even the patient should follow hand hygiene prac-
tices (e.g. washing hands before and after touch-
ing a patient or the environment, even when no
epidemic is apparent). Following the SARS out-
break in a nearby hospital, HCWs at NTUH ER
wear N-95 respirators for all patient care. However,
masks do not prevent acquisition of SARS from 
a contaminated environment.28,65 Furthermore,
it is likely the spread of SARS was facilitated by
lack of proper hand washing after taking care of
unrecognized SARS patients.34 Compliance moni-
toring and reinforcement are needed for maximal
effectiveness of infection control measures.
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Table. Comparison between two important emerging respiratory infectious diseases
Severe acute respiratory syndrome Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1
Etiology RNA virus of the family Coronaviridae RNA virus of the family Orthomyxoviridae
National host reservoirs Palm civet, raccoon dogs and Wild bird and domestic poultry including
and intermediate hosts horseshoe bats chicken, geese, ducks, quail
Mode of transmission Predominantly human-to-human Predominantly direct avian-to-human
transmission through droplet transmission, transmission through droplet and
direct and indirect contact of the patients or contact transmission
fomites contaminated by respiratory 
secretions, feces, urine, and tears of infected 
individuals, airborne only in unique situation
Human-to-human Efficient and sustained Limited and nonsustained, but mutation 
transmission might occur in the future resulting in 
improved transmission and possibly a 
pandemic in humans*
Incubation period 2–14 days 2–8 days
Clinical presentations - Nonrespiratory prodrome lasting 2–7 days - High fever with flu-like illness, or 
characterized by one or more of the following: diarrhea, vomiting with abdominal and 
fever, headache, malaise, myalgia, diarrhea pleuritic pain progress rapidly within the 
- Respiratory phase beginning 2–7 days after onset, first week to respiratory failure 
characterized by nonproductive cough and dyspnea - Lymphopenia, thrombocytopenia 
- Lymphopenia, thrombocytopenia, elevated and elevated transaminases
transaminases, lactate dehydrogenase and 
creatine phosphokinase levels
- Physical signs on chest examination are minimal
compared with radiographic findings which
show abnormalities (ground-glass opacities
and focal consolidations, especially in periphery
and subpleural regions of the lower zones)
in almost all patients by the second week of illness;
shifting of radiographic shadows and progressive
involvement of both lungs are not uncommon
Transmissibility - Transmissible on or after the 5th day of Most infectious before and in the first  
onset of fever, in line with rising viral load in 2 days of illness
nasopharyngeal secretions that peak at 
around day 10
- Average number of secondary cases 
resulting from a single case was 2–4
Crude fatality rate 9.6% (774/8096) 62.7% (226/360)
Early detection strategy - Fever surveillance, clinical presentation plus - Clinical presentation plus 
epidemiologic risk factors† epidemiologic risk factors§
- Direct detection of viral nucleic acids in - Immunologic detection of viral 
respiratory secretions by RT-PCR‡ antigen in respiratory secretions, direct 
detection of viral RNA in respiratory 
secretions by RT-PCR
- Repeated collection of multiple specimen 
types is recommended
(Contd.)
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Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette
Healthcare facilities should promote respiratory
hygiene/cough etiquette by educating HCWs, pa-
tients, caregivers, and visitors on the importance of
containing respiratory spray and secretions to help
prevent the transmission of influenza and other
respiratory viruses.14,36,66 Healthcare facilities
should post signs requesting that patients and fam-
ily members with acute febrile respiratory illness
use respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette and pro-
vide resources for hand hygiene in common areas.
It is likely that some aerosol-generating med-
ical procedures (such as endotracheal intubation,
open suctioning, nebulizer treatment, broncho-
scopy, and positive airway pressure devices) could
increase the potential for generation of small aero-
sols in the immediate vicinity of the patient and
may inadvertently spread the disease.34 Thus, these
procedures should be performed with precau-
tions and kept in mind for emerging diseases,
tuberculosis and other respiratory infectious dis-
eases. During the epidemic, clear guidelines should
be laid out to protect the frontline staff from un-
necessary exposure which may jeopardize their
lives. In addition, aerosol-generating procedures
should be performed in an airborne isolation 
environment.36
Recognition of a new disease or 
a cluster of infection
A repeated theme in reviewing emergent out-
breaks is that it is essential that astute clinicians
with sufficient experience recognize and distin-
guish something new.25,36 Appropriate history tak-
ing when a patient with a fever is seen, to obtain
important information, such as recent travel his-
tory, occupation, contacts with possibly infected
persons, persons with similar symptoms, sick or
dead animals, or a cluster of persons with similar
symptoms, could help to quickly identify people
at risk and reduce spread.
Immediate source and contact tracing,
quarantine and isolation
Source and contact tracing should rapidly iden-
tify possible early secondary cases and any unrec-
ognized sources of infection for persons without
epidemiologic links. Regarding risk of intrahospital
Table. Continued
Severe acute respiratory syndrome Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1
Confirmatory diagnosis Virus isolation in respiratory, fecal, urine, Virus isolation in respiratory secretions, 
tissue specimens, immunologic detection of immunologic detection of antibody in 
antibody in paired serum samples paired serum samples
Hospital infection - Early recognition, triage, and prompt - Same as for SARS
control methods isolation of suspected cases - Anticipated performances of
- Personal protective equipment triage for early recognition of suspected
- Droplet and contact precautions, airborne cases and temperature check to prevent
precautions for aerosol-generating procedures intrahospital spread are poor as compared
- Contact tracing and quarantine of contacts, to those during SARS epidemic
temperature check at entry points
Availability of vaccines Under development Under development
Availability of antivirals No Oral oseltamivir, inhaled zanamivir
*In Asia, risk of reassortment is particularly high as large populations of domestic poultry and pigs live in close proximity to humans; live birds and poultry
are sold in markets, thereby increasing the chance of spread of infection from sick birds to humans. Recent molecular analysis of the complete genome of
the 1918 virus revealed that this virus was not a reassortment strain but more likely an avian virus that had adapted to infect humans. 
†Use of WHO SARS criteria as a clinical screening tool gave a sensitivity of 28%, specificity of 96%, positive predictive value of 11%, and negative predic-
tive value of 99%. 
‡Only 35–65% of specimens tested positive in the first few days of the disease using the first generation of RT-PCR assays. 
§Avian influenza was the initial diagnosis in only 10% of patients with confirmed H5N1 virus infection in Indonesian and Thai series.
spread of a highly contagious disease, infection-
control teams may additionally institute passive
or active surveillance for pneumonia or fever
among staff and patients, combined with diag-
nostic testing for the infectious agent. The inten-
sity of surveillance efforts will need to be tailored
to the degree of local transmission within both
the community and healthcare facilities.
Specific infection control measures were imple-
mented for patients with SARS, H5N1, or other
highly contagious diseases.14,25,28,36 In non-SARS
areas, infection control measures were upgraded
stepwise in response to possible healthcare asso-
ciated transmission and the increasing possibil-
ity of community spread of SARS. On the other
hand, personal protective equipment in hospital
services caring for SARS or avian influenza, and its
disposition were stratified based on the risk as-
sessment because resources might be limited.12,67
In response to inadequate capacity of the nega-
tive pressure isolation room within the intensive
care facility, intubated patients whose airway se-
cretions, stool and urine become negative for
SARS-CoV or H5N1 RNA should be removed from
the negative pressure isolation rooms. Droplet and
contact precautions and inline suction should be
performed in single rooms.
Risk assessment
In facing emerging infectious diseases, WHO em-
phasizes risk assessment, including burden as-
sessment and needs assessment.12 Disease pattern,
population at risk and factors affecting transmis-
sion pattern and control activities will be deter-
mined or characterized. The scale of interventions
required to control an epidemic depends on the
number of infectious cases present at the time the
control measures are instituted and on logistical
constraints, such as availability of isolation facil-
ities. Furthermore, isolation and quarantine pro-
cedures will be less effective as more cases accrue.68
Therefore, stringent measures implemented early
in the course of the epidemic prevent the need for
more stringent measures as the epidemic spreads.18
Nevertheless, it is practical and most feasible that
routine infection control strategies and traditional,
standard interventions used during outbreak con-
trol should be applied immediately before labo-
ratory confirmation of the causative agent. Hand
and respiratory hygiene should be promoted.
Domestic cleaning using household cleaning
products, to reduce transmission via fomites and
from infectious respiratory secretions on surfaces,
is important as well.12
Risk communication
Finally, risk communication is essential not only
within or between institutions, but also within
and between local and national public health au-
thorities.69 Disease outbreaks are inevitable, and
often unpredictable, events. The environment sur-
rounding an outbreak is unique in public health.
Outbreaks are frequently marked by uncertainty,
confusion and a sense of urgency. Communica-
tion failures delay outbreak control, undermine
public trust and compliance, and unnecessarily
prolong economic, social and political turmoil.
If implemented effectively, guidelines for outbreak
communication will result in greater public re-
silience and guide appropriate public participation
to support the rapid containment of an outbreak,
thus limiting morbidity and mortality.69 In addi-
tion, effective outbreak communication will min-
imize the damage to a nation’s international
standing, its economy and its public health infra-
structure. However, the decisions and actions of
public health officials have a greater effect on trust
and public risk perception than communication.
Conclusion
The population-dense regions of Southeast Asia
are the epicenter of many emerging diseases, as
evidenced by the outbreak of SARS, avian in-
fluenza A/H5N1, dengue, and enterovirus 71 in
this region in the past decade. Rapid identification,
epidemiologic surveillance, and prevention of
transmission are major challenges in ensuring
public health safety. Pandemic prevention strate-
gies must be based on preparing for the unex-
pected and being capable of reacting accordingly.
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Strategies for survival in the face of emerging path-
ogens include biotechnology (chemoprophylaxis,
vaccines, treatment), public health (for food-
borne, water-borne and fecal-borne diseases), and
behavior modification (for sexually transmitted
diseases).70 However, prevention of airborne
transmission of microbes remains a challenge.
The primary role of an infection-control pro-
gram is to reduce the risk of healthcare-associated
infection, thereby protecting patients, HCWs and
visitors. Prevention of transmission of a conta-
gious infectious disease is thus an important
guard for the whole society. Healthy habits can
protect everyone from getting germs or spreading
germs at home, school or work. Simple actions,
like covering your mouth and nose and washing
your hands often, can stop germs and prevent 
illnesses.66
Emerging infectious diseases can be contained
with high-level government commitment and in-
ternational collaboration to strengthen infectious
disease surveillance and response, improve meth-
ods for gathering and evaluating surveillance data,
ensure the use of surveillance data to improve
public health practice and medical treatment,
strengthen a nation’s capacity to monitor and re-
spond to emerging infectious diseases, implement,
support, and evaluate programs for the preven-
tion and control of emerging infectious diseases,
and to develop, evaluate, and promote strategies
to help healthcare providers and other persons
change behavior that facilitates disease transmis-
sion. The mobilization and coordination of efforts
at all levels of government and private sectors are
also important. Furthermore, international col-
laboration and resource and information shar-
ing are also essential for the control of emerging
diseases worldwide.
However, challenges remain, including how
best to allocate limited medical and public health
resources for preparedness planning. Whether
avian influenza will become a pandemic or SARS
will become a recurring problem is uncertain, but
lessons learned while preparing for that eventu-
ality will be important for other global infectious
disease outbreaks.
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